| 1 |
BACnet |
A protocol for building automation and control networks. |
TCP: 47808 |
Secure Authentication and TLS encryption |
Vulnerable to unauthorized access, DoS attacks |
HVAC systems, lighting control, energy management |
Honeywell, Johnson Controls, Siemens |
| 2 |
BACnet/IP |
A variant of BACnet protocol using IP networks for building automation. |
UDP: 47808 |
Secure Authentication and TLS encryption |
Vulnerable to unauthorized access, DoS attacks |
Building automation, control and monitoring |
Honeywell, Johnson Controls, Siemens |
| 3 |
BACnet/IPv6 |
A variant of BACnet protocol using IPv6 for building automation. |
UDP: 47808 |
Secure Authentication and TLS encryption |
Vulnerable to unauthorized access, DoS attacks |
Building automation, control and monitoring with IPv6 |
Honeywell, Johnson Controls, Siemens |
| 4 |
CANbus |
A bus standard for communication in vehicle systems. |
N/A |
Not Available (Plain Text) |
Vulnerable to spoofing, replay attacks |
Automotive systems, control units |
Bosch, Continental, Delphi |
| 5 |
CANopen |
A higher-layer protocol based on CANbus for industrial automation. |
N/A |
Not Available (Plain Text) |
Vulnerable to unauthorized access, message injection |
Industrial automation, motion control systems |
Beckhoff Automation, Bosch, Omron |
| 6 |
CC-Link |
A fieldbus protocol for industrial automation in Asia. |
TCP: 5000 |
AES encryption (Inherent encryption) |
Lack of authentication, susceptible to eavesdropping |
Industrial automation, motion control systems in Asia |
Mitsubishi Electric, Panasonic, Hitachi |
| 7 |
CC-Link IE |
An industrial Ethernet protocol for automation systems in Asia. |
TCP: 44818, 2222 |
IPsec encryption (Achieved through IPsec implementation) |
Potential vulnerabilities in authentication and encryption |
Industrial automation, motion control systems in Asia |
Mitsubishi Electric, Panasonic, Hitachi |
| 8 |
CIP |
A protocol for communication in industrial automation networks. |
TCP/UDP: 44818, 2222 |
TLS encryption |
Potential vulnerabilities in authentication and encryption |
Integration of control systems, data exchange, safety devices |
Rockwell Automation, Schneider Electric |
| 9 |
CIP Motion |
A protocol for motion control in industrial automation systems. |
TCP: 44818, 2222 |
TLS encryption |
Potential vulnerabilities in authentication and encryption |
Industrial motion control systems |
Rockwell Automation, Schneider Electric |
| 10 |
CIP Safety |
A safety protocol for communication in industrial control systems. |
TCP: 44818, 2222 |
TLS encryption |
Potential vulnerabilities in authentication and encryption |
Safety-critical applications, control system integration |
Rockwell Automation, Schneider Electric |
| 11 |
DeviceNet |
A network protocol for communication with industrial devices. |
TCP: 44818, 2222 |
IPsec encryption (Achieved through IPsec implementation) |
Potential vulnerabilities in authentication and encryption |
Industrial device communication, sensor integration |
Rockwell Automation, Schneider Electric |
| 12 |
DNP3 |
A robust and secure protocol for communication in electric power systems. |
TCP: 20000-20005 |
Secure Authentication |
Vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks, lack of key management |
Electric power systems, water/wastewater management |
General Electric, Siemens, ABB |
| 13 |
EnOcean |
A wireless communication protocol for energy harvesting devices. |
Various |
AES encryption (Inherent encryption) |
Potential vulnerabilities in authentication and encryption |
Energy harvesting devices, building automation, wireless sensor networks |
EnOcean, Texas Instruments, Siemens |
| 14 |
EtherCAT |
A real-time Ethernet protocol for communication in motion control systems. |
TCP/UDP: 37980 |
IPsec encryption (Achieved through IPsec implementation) |
Vulnerabilities in authentication, data integrity |
Motion control, automation systems |
Beckhoff Automation, Omron, Bosch |
| 15 |
EtherCAT P |
A power-over-EtherCAT protocol for communication and power delivery. |
UDP: 8899 |
IPsec encryption (Achieved through IPsec implementation) |
Vulnerabilities in authentication, data integrity |
Motion control, automation systems with power delivery |
Beckhoff Automation, Omron, Bosch |
| 16 |
EtherNet/IP |
An industrial Ethernet protocol for real-time control and data exchange. |
TCP: 44818, UDP: 2222 |
IPsec encryption (Achieved through IPsec implementation) |
Potential vulnerabilities in authentication and encryption |
Integration of control systems, safety devices, data exchange |
Rockwell Automation, Schneider Electric |
| 17 |
EtherNet/IPTap |
A protocol for network traffic monitoring in EtherNet/IP networks. |
TCP: 2222 |
IPsec encryption (Achieved through IPsec implementation) |
Vulnerable to unauthorized access, data integrity issues |
Network traffic monitoring, diagnostics in EtherNet/IP networks |
Rockwell Automation, Schneider Electric |
| 18 |
Fieldbus HSE |
A high-speed Ethernet protocol for fieldbus communication. |
TCP: 2222 |
Not Available (Plain Text) |
Vulnerabilities in authentication, data integrity |
Fieldbus communication, high-speed data exchange |
ABB, Emerson, Yokogawa |
| 19 |
FL Net |
FL-net is used in industrial control systems for factory automation. |
UDP: 55000-55003 |
Not Available (Plain Text) |
Vulnerabilities in authentication, data privacy |
Manufacturing, process control applications, Robotics |
Omron, Mitsubishi |
| 20 |
Foundation Fieldbus |
A digital communication protocol for process control systems. |
TCP: 2222 |
Not Available (Plain Text) |
Vulnerabilities in authentication, data integrity |
Process control, monitoring and diagnostics |
ABB, Emerson, Yokogawa |
| 21 |
FOUNDATION FIELDBUS HSE |
A high-speed Ethernet protocol for process control systems. |
TCP/UDP: 1089-1091 |
Not Available (Plain Text) |
Vulnerabilities in authentication, data integrity |
Process control, high-speed data exchange |
Emerson, Yokogawa, ABB |
| 22 |
H1/H2 Fieldbus |
A fieldbus protocol used in process automation and control systems. |
TCP: 102 |
Not Available (Plain Text) |
Vulnerable to unauthorized access, data integrity issues |
Process automation, control and monitoring |
Yokogawa, Honeywell, ABB |
| 23 |
HART |
A protocol for communication with intelligent field devices. |
TCP: 5094 |
Not Available (Plain Text) |
Vulnerable to spoofing, tampering |
Industrial process monitoring and control |
Emerson, Honeywell, Yokogawa |
| 24 |
HART-IP |
A variant of HART protocol using IP networks for industrial applications. |
UDP: 5094 |
IPsec encryption (Achieved through IPsec implementation) |
Vulnerable to spoofing, tampering |
Industrial process monitoring and control over IP networks |
Emerson, Honeywell, Yokogawa |
| 25 |
ICCP/TASE.2 |
A protocol for real-time information exchange between control centers. |
TCP: 102 |
TLS encryption |
Vulnerable to unauthorized access, data integrity issues |
Inter-control center communication, energy management systems |
General Electric, Siemens, ABB |
| 26 |
IEC 60870-5 |
A protocol for communication in electrical utility automation systems. |
TCP: 2404 |
Not Available (Plain Text) |
Lack of authentication, vulnerable to DoS attacks |
Monitoring and control of electrical power systems |
Siemens, ABB, Schneider Electric |
| 27 |
IEC 61850 |
A protocol for communication in substation automation systems. |
TCP: 102, UDP: 102 |
TLS encryption |
Vulnerabilities in authentication, data integrity |
Electric power substation automation, smart grid applications |
ABB, Siemens, Schneider Electric |
| 28 |
IEC 61883 |
A protocol for audio and video transmission in professional applications. |
UDP: 61883 |
Not Available (Plain Text) |
Vulnerabilities in authentication, data privacy |
Audio/video transmission, professional multimedia applications |
Sony, Panasonic, Canon |
| 29 |
IEC 62351 |
A suite of protocols for secure communication in power systems. |
TCP: 102 |
TLS encryption |
Vulnerabilities in authentication, key management |
Secure communication in electric power systems |
Siemens, ABB, Schneider Electric |
| 30 |
IEEE C37.118 |
Defines a method for exchange of synchronized phasor measurement data between power system equipments. |
TCP: 4712, UDP: 4713 |
Not Available (Plain Text) |
Vulnerabilities in authentication, data privacy |
Energy and Power Industries |
GE, Schneider, ABB, Siemens, SEL, Alstom |
| 31 |
J1939 |
A protocol for communication in heavy-duty vehicles and equipment. |
N/A |
Not Available (Plain Text) |
Vulnerable to spoofing, replay attacks |
Heavy-duty vehicle communication, diagnostics and control |
Bosch, Cummins, Volvo |
| 32 |
KNX |
A protocol for building automation and control networks. |
TCP/UDP: 3671, 3672 |
Secure Authentication and TLS encryption |
Potential vulnerabilities in authentication and encryption |
Building automation, lighting control, HVAC systems |
ABB, Schneider Electric, Siemens |
| 33 |
KNXnet/IP |
A variant of KNX protocol using IP networks for building automation. |
TCP: 3671, 3672 |
Secure Authentication and TLS encryption |
Potential vulnerabilities in authentication and encryption |
Building automation, lighting control, HVAC systems with IP connectivity |
ABB, Schneider Electric, Siemens |
| 34 |
LonWorks |
A protocol for control networks used in building automation. |
TCP: 1626 |
AES encryption (Inherent encryption) |
Vulnerabilities in authentication, data privacy |
Building automation, lighting control, energy management |
Echelon, Siemens, Schneider Electric |
| 35 |
M-Bus |
A protocol for remote reading of utility meters. |
TCP: 50000 |
Not Available (Plain Text) |
Vulnerable to unauthorized access, data integrity issues |
Utility metering, remote meter reading |
Kamstrup, Itron, Siemens |
| 36 |
MelsecNet |
A protocol for communication in Mitsubishi Electric PLC systems. |
TCP: 5007 |
Not Available (Plain Text) |
Vulnerabilities in authentication, data integrity |
Industrial automation, process control systems |
Mitsubishi Electric, Omron, Hitachi |
| 37 |
MMS |
A protocol for real-time data communication in industrial systems. |
TCP/UDP: 102 |
TLS encryption |
Vulnerabilities in authentication, data integrity |
Industrial control systems, real-time data exchange |
General Electric, Schneider Electric, ABB |
| 38 |
Modbus |
A serial communication protocol widely used in industrial automation. |
TCP: 502 |
Not Available (Plain Text) |
Lack of authentication, susceptible to eavesdropping |
SCADA systems, industrial control and monitoring |
Schneider Electric, Siemens, ABB |
| 39 |
Modbus TCP/IP |
A variant of Modbus protocol using TCP/IP for communication. |
TCP: 502 |
Secure Authentication and TLS encryption |
Lack of authentication, susceptible to eavesdropping |
SCADA systems, industrial control and monitoring |
Schneider Electric, Siemens, ABB |
| 40 |
Modbus/TCP |
A variant of Modbus protocol using TCP/IP for communication. |
TCP: 502 |
Secure Authentication and TLS encryption |
Lack of authentication, susceptible to eavesdropping |
SCADA systems, industrial control and monitoring |
Schneider Electric, Siemens, ABB |
| 41 |
MQTT |
A lightweight messaging protocol for IoT and M2M communication. |
TCP: 1883 |
TLS encryption |
Vulnerabilities in authentication, data privacy |
IoT, remote monitoring, real-time data exchange |
IBM, Microsoft, Amazon Web Services |
| 42 |
OPC DA |
A standard for interoperability between industrial automation systems. |
TCP: 1024-65535 |
Not Available (Plain Text) |
Vulnerable to unauthorized access, lack of data integrity |
Industrial automation, device and software integration |
Rockwell Automation, Honeywell, Yokogawa |
| 43 |
OPC UA |
A standard for interoperability between industrial automation systems. |
TCP: 4840 |
TLS encryption |
Vulnerable to unauthorized access, lack of data integrity |
Industrial automation, device and software integration |
Rockwell Automation, Honeywell, Yokogawa |
| 44 |
PROFIBUS |
A fieldbus protocol for communication in automation systems. |
TCP: 3668 |
Not Available (Plain Text) |
Vulnerable to eavesdropping, unauthorized access |
Sensors, actuators, controllers in manufacturing |
Siemens, Phoenix Contact, ABB |
| 45 |
Profinet |
A communication protocol for real-time data exchange in industrial automation. |
TCP/UDP: 34962-34964 |
IPsec encryption (Achieved through IPsec implementation) |
Vulnerabilities in access control, authentication mechanisms |
Manufacturing, process control applications |
Siemens, Phoenix Contact, B&R Automation |
| 46 |
PROFINET IO |
A real-time industrial Ethernet protocol for automation systems. |
TCP/UDP: 34962-34964 |
IPsec encryption (Achieved through IPsec implementation) |
Vulnerabilities in access control, authentication mechanisms |
Industrial automation, process control applications |
Siemens, Phoenix Contact, B&R Automation |
| 47 |
PROFIsafe |
A safety communication protocol for fail-safe automation systems. |
TCP/UDP: 34962-34964 |
IPsec encryption (Achieved through IPsec implementation) |
Vulnerabilities in access control, authentication mechanisms |
Safety-critical applications, industrial automation |
Siemens, Phoenix Contact, B&R Automation |
| 48 |
S7Comm |
A proprietary protocol used in Siemens S7-300 and S7-400 PLCs. |
TCP: 102 |
Secure Authentication and TLS encryption |
Vulnerabilities in authentication, data integrity |
Industrial automation, control systems |
Siemens, Schneider Electric, ABB |
| 49 |
SNMP |
A protocol for network management and monitoring of devices. |
UDP: 161, 162 |
v3 has encryption |
Vulnerabilities in authentication, data privacy |
Network management, device monitoring and control |
Cisco, Juniper Networks, Hewlett Packard Enterprise |
| 50 |
Vnet |
Yokogawa Proprietery protocol for Centum CS Controllers |
UDP: 5313 |
Can use SSL/TSL encryption |
Weak authentication , Data integrity, Dos |
All sectors in Industrial Automation |
Yokogawa |
| 51 |
Vnet/IP |
Yokogawa Proprietery protocol for Centum VP Controllers |
TCP: 44818 |
Can use SSL/TSL encryption |
Weak authentication , Data integrity, Dos |
All sectors in Industrial Automation |
Yokogawa |
| 52 |
WirelessHART |
A wireless communication protocol based on HART for industrial applications. |
UDP: 5093 |
AES-128 encryption (Inherent encryption) |
Vulnerable to jamming, unauthorized access |
Wireless monitoring and control of industrial processes |
Emerson, Honeywell, Siemens |
| 53 |
WirelessMBus |
A wireless communication protocol for utility metering applications. |
TCP: 50000 |
AES-128 encryption (Inherent encryption) |
Vulnerable to unauthorized access, data integrity issues |
Wireless utility metering, remote meter reading |
Kamstrup, Itron, Siemens |
| 54 |
WISA |
A wireless protocol for industrial automation and control. |
UDP: 49200 |
Not Available (Plain Text) |
Vulnerable to unauthorized access, data integrity issues |
Wireless industrial control and monitoring, asset management |
Endress+Hauser, Pepperl+Fuchs, ABB |
| 55 |
WISA Wireless |
A wireless protocol for communication in industrial automation. |
UDP: 49200 |
Not Available (Plain Text) |
Vulnerable to unauthorized access, data integrity issues |
Wireless industrial control and monitoring, asset management |
Endress+Hauser, Pepperl+Fuchs, ABB |
| 56 |
Zigbee |
A wireless communication protocol for low-power, low-data-rate IoT devices. |
Various |
AES encryption (Inherent encryption) |
Vulnerabilities in authentication, data privacy |
Home automation, smart lighting, wireless sensor networks |
Philips, Texas Instruments, Silicon Labs |
| 57 |
Zigbee IP |
A variant of Zigbee protocol using IP networks for IoT applications. |
Various |
AES encryption (Inherent encryption) |
Vulnerabilities in authentication, data privacy |
IoT applications, wireless sensor networks with IP connectivity |
Philips, Texas Instruments, Silicon Labs |
| 58 |
Zigbee RF4CE |
A variant of Zigbee protocol for remote control applications. |
Various |
AES encryption (Inherent encryption) |
Vulnerabilities in authentication, data privacy |
Remote controls, consumer electronics |
Philips, Texas Instruments, Silicon Labs |
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