Systems that cannot be patched
Controllers on operating systems the vendor stopped supporting years ago.
Our answerWall them off. Their own zone, one controlled path in and out, and eyes on that path.
OT cybersecurity
We find what matters, fix it without stopping the plant, and leave your team able to run it. Passive first, vendor-agnostic, and what you already own before anything new.
How we work
They are how we keep your plant running while we work on it, and why our advice does not end in a shopping list.
Assessments work from documents, interviews, configurations and network traffic. We never scan live controllers.
Penetration tests run during FAT, SAT or scheduled downtime, or in a test environment, under signed rules of engagement with stop conditions.
No vendor affiliation and no referral fees. We recommend what fits your plant, including lower-cost or open-source options.
Early fixes mostly use what you already have: firewall rules, switch settings, accounts and backups.
Services
Three stages, ten services. Most plants start on the left with an assessment, then move right: a funded plan, the fixes, and people who can keep it running.
Three plant projects, and what we chose not to doKnow exactly where you stand before spending a rupee on tooling.
A rapid review of architecture, governance and maturity gaps, with zero impact on operations.
See the serviceDetailed, standards-driven validation (IEC 62443, NIST) through passive methods.
See the serviceAttack simulation during FAT, SAT or scheduled downtime, or in a test environment.
See the serviceFrom findings to a funded, phased programme your board approves.
Findings turned into a phased plan, with the money to buy and the money to run, ready for board approval.
See the serviceGovernance, policies, and incident response planning for long-term security.
See the serviceVendor-agnostic deployment, from firewalls to the OT SOC, with no disruption to processes.
See the servicePeople and muscle memory, trained on real PLCs, not slides.
Fundamentals for plant and field staff: USB safety, threat recognition.
See the serviceRole-specific defence skills for engineers taking on security duties.
See the servicePortable, realistic OT testbeds with real PLCs and SCADA.
See the serviceHigh-pressure simulations testing technical and executive teams together.
See the serviceWhere to start
Most plant engagements begin with one of these. If yours is not here, tell us what you are dealing with and we will point you to the right first step.
What we find
And what we do about each. The first fixes are usually configuration changes on equipment you already own.
Controllers on operating systems the vendor stopped supporting years ago.
Our answerWall them off. Their own zone, one controlled path in and out, and eyes on that path.
Historian links, vendor VPNs and convenience connections have quietly joined IT and OT into a single network.
Our answerDraw the zones, agree the conduits, then enforce them.
Vendor tunnels that never close, shared passwords, sessions nobody records.
Our answerOne door in, every session recorded, access that expires.
A document written for the audit and kept in a folder. When something happens, the first hour goes on finding out who to call.
Our answerA plan written for your plant, then exercised with the people who will use it, until the first hour is routine.
Technology and standards
These are the technology categories behind our implementation work, placed where they belong on the Purdue model and rated by how critical each one is to a defensible plant. Everything is staged on our testbed before it touches production.
Every other control assumes the plant is not flat. Segmentation is the first thing an assessment finds missing and the first thing an attacker exploits.
Internet-exposed controllers, IT ransomware spilling into the plant, lateral movement between units.
Remote access is the most common confirmed entry point in industrial incidents. Standing VPN tunnels and shared vendor logins are the door attackers walk through.
Stolen VPN credentials, unmonitored vendor sessions, dormant accounts.

Recovery time is the difference between a three-day restart and a five-week shutdown. Backups only count if the restore has been rehearsed.
Lost PLC logic and HMI projects, extended outages, ransom pressure.

You cannot defend assets you cannot see. Passive monitoring is the only way to get a true inventory and to notice a rogue Modbus write before the process does.
Unknown devices, protocol misuse, months-long dwell time.
HMIs, historians and engineering stations are ordinary Windows machines that run for a decade unpatched. Allow-listing makes that survivable.
Ransomware execution, USB-borne malware, unauthorised engineering tools.

For the paths a firewall alone does not close: a diode lets historian traffic leave L2/L3 for IT with no way back, a USB kiosk is the only route removable media takes to a Level 2 workstation, and a decoy SIS, DCS or IED gives an intruder something to touch and you an alert.
Traffic flowing back into OT, USB-borne malware, quiet lateral movement toward controllers.

Logos indicate technologies we work with, not endorsements. Client logos available on request.
Industries
Each industry page walks through the process stage by stage, where it is exposed, and which of these services tackles each challenge.
View all industriesQuestions
Find out what you actually have and where it is exposed, before buying anything. A gap assessment does exactly that: two to four weeks, fully passive, ending in a prioritised list of what to fix first and what it will roughly take. Most plants discover the first few fixes are configuration changes on equipment they already own, not new products.Gap Assessment
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Where it is, what runs it, and what worries you. One conversation with a senior advisor, no sales pressure.